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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The original brief of Appellant was filed with the Supreme
Court for the State of Utah on November 1, 1993. Pursuant to Rule
42, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and an order of the Supreme
Court, dated November 24, 1993, this matter was transferred to the
Court of Appeals.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes or ordinances
which are at issue for this appeal.

SUMMARY OF REPLY ARGUMENTS
The primary issue before this court is whether or not the
trial court had sufficient evidence to find for counterclaimant,
John Prince, and enter a monetary judgment against Fred Healey.
One of the issues at trial was whether or not an entity known
as Income Fund should have been included in the transfer of assets.
The trial court found there was sufficient evidence which would
require the transfer of Income Fund.

Appellant has not made any

issues regarding Income Fund on appeal, yet the principal argument

set forth in the responsive brief of Appellee is that Income Fund
should have been included in the transfer.

That issue is not

before this court.
The bulk of Appellant's brief was addressed towards the lack
of evidence which the trial Court had, or in this case did not
have, to render substantial monetary judgments against Fred Healey.
In the responsive brief of Appellee, there is only cursory argument
with regard to those money judgments, and at no time does Appellee
set forth any reasonable evidence for the Court making that
decision, and does not in any way refute the evidence which is set
forth in Appellant's brief to show there was not a basis to enter
the monetary judgments against Fred Healey.
Appellee attempts to set forth certain arguments regarding
Appellant's failure to set forth the value of the partnership
assets at the time of trial now precludes and order of the Court
allowing the enforcement of the original Memorandum Agreement
entered into between the parties.

There is no legal basis for

making such assertions, and therefore that portion of Appellee's
brief is improperly before this Court.

iii

INTRODUCTION
Appellant, Fred Healey, (hereinafter "Healey"), by and through
his counsel, Les F. England, hereby files with the above-captioned
Court the following reply to those arguments and allegations as set
forth in the Brief of Appellee.
Rather than give a detailed and redundant recitation of the
arguments as contained in both Appellant's brief and Appellee's
brief, Appellant will respond directly to those arguments as set
forth in the Brief of Appellee.
REPLY NO. 1
THE TRANSFER OF INCOME FUND IS NOT AN
ISSUE FOR THE APPELLATE COURT TO ADDRESS
The First Argument and Second Argument, as set forth in the
brief of Appellee (hereinafter referred to as "Prince"), sets forth
arguments which are not at issue for this appeal.

Prince spends

substantial time, space and effort in his brief setting forth
conclusions of law and findings of fact as to why the trial court
was correct in determining that the entity known as Income Fund was
included in the parties original agreement, and therefore properly
determined by the trial court to be the property of Prince. Prince
spends an inordinate amount of argument, strictly for the sake of
argument, setting forth issues which are not before this Court.
Simply put, the transfer of Income Fund to Prince, as required
by the trial court, has not been advanced by Healey as an issue to
be determined on appeal.

While it is true that Healey does not

agree with the trial court, and does not believe Income Fund should
1

have been included in the transfer of assets, Healey does not
assert in this appeal that the finding of Judge Frederick in that
regard were an abuse of discretion, nor founded on an insufficient
factual basis.
The only basis for inclusion of the Income Fund entity in the
issues on appeal is whether or not the failure by Healey to
transfer Income Fund was a material breach of the Memorandum
Agreement.

As set forth in both parties original briefs, the

Memorandum Agreement is the only written agreement between the
parties, and

said agreement was the basis

for the original

complaint as filed by Healey against Prince.
Throughout trial there was no dispute as to whether Income
Fund was included or not included in the transfer of assets between
the parties.

Prince felt, at some point, that Income Fund should

have been included.

Healey felt, early on, that Income Fund was

not one of the entities that was included in the transfer of
assets, because the parties did not have joint control over Income
Fund.

The dispute at trial was the parties interpretation of the

agreement, not the actual transfer or lack of transfer of the
entity. Both parties acknowledged the transfer was not made prior
to trial.
Prince refers to testimony at trial which sets forth his
belief, that Income Fund was part of the parties' joint business
enterprise.
The statement is simply not true.
took place:
2

The following testimony

(Mr. Prince) "The best explanation I can give, Les, is
I thought we were partners. It's really that simple. I
didn't think about Income Fund. I didn't have any idea
it was such a mammoth income creator. I just thought we
were partners. . ." (R. 869, L. 19-23)
It is obvious from the foregoing exchange that Income Fund was
not

even

contemplated

by

Prince

until

some time

after the

Memorandum Agreement was entered into, and even then, it was not
discussed as being part of the deal, until Prince realized that it
may be more than a liability, with some basis for income as well.
When Mr. Prince was examined regarding his understanding of
what ownership, he had if any of Income Fund, he recited the
following exchange from his deposition:
A: So at that point I would have owned whatever
Healeys owned in Income Fund so after, I guess
I would assume I owned it before— I know— I guess
before that — I guess I wouldn't have owned it.
(R. 869, L. 10-13)
There is no contradictory testimony to that cited above, and
yet the Court seems to come to the conclusion that there was a
willful, intentional withholding of Income Fund, by Mr. Healey, and
yet even Mr. Prince believed that prior to the Memorandum Agreement
he did not have any ownership interest in Income Fund, except for
his limited partner shares, for which he had received identical
payments as to those shares owned by Mr. Healey.
At trial, based upon the evidence, Judge Frederick made the
finding that Income Fund was an entity that should have been
transferred under the terms of the Memorandum Agreement.
Subsequent to trial, Healey has done everything to transfer
his interest in Income Fund, and that transfer is not an issue for
3

the appellate Court to address.
REPLY NO. 2
THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE TO SHOW THE FAILURE OF HEALEY
TO TRANSFER INCOME FUND WAS DONE IN BAD FAITH
Prince feels the need to argue matters not before this Court,
by asserting that the failure of Healey to transfer Income Fund was
done in bad faith, and therefore such behavior excused all other
aspects of performance of the Memorandum Agreement.
As set forth in Healey's original brief, the evidence and
testimony is voluminous that there were numerous entities which the
parties

acted

as

partners

together,

and

Prince

and

Healey

acknowledged that there were numerous entities, all of which were
difficult to grasp. It is one thing for the Court to conclude that
Income

Fund

should

have

been

included

in

the

transfer

of

partnership assets, but for the Court to reach the conclusion that
Healey's failure to include Income Fund in the transfer of assets
was done in bad faith is simply not supported by the evidence. In
Prince's Second Argument he attempts to recite the Conclusions of
Law and Findings of Fact which set forth Judge Frederick's ruling
that the actions of Healey were done in bad faith, and further,
that such actions were a breach of fiduciary duty by Healey.
However, Prince makes no recitation to the record of any evidence
which supports those bold conclusions and findings. As set forth
numerous times, and as the principal basis for this appeal, there
were simply insufficient facts to allow and otherwise permit the
trial court to come to the conclusions that it did.
In page 23 of Prince's Brief, an additional redundant argument.
4

is made that as a General Partner of Income Fund, Healey caused a
demand letter to be delivered to Prince for the payment of
$696,500.00. The demand letter was delivered on behalf of limited
partners and had nothing to do with Healey.

This action has no

relevance, and what Prince failed to point out, as supported by
uncontroverted evidence, is that Healey was the General Partner of
Income Fund at Prince's insistence, and was not entitled to any
more of the distributions from Income Fund than Prince, since both
parties held identical limited partnership shares.

The demand

letter in questions was in response to threats by other limited
partners, with whom, both Prince and Healey would be equally
liable.

The demand letter in question was no more directed to

Prince than to Healey. Healey would ultimately be responsible for
any monies paid to other limited partners in the same proportion as
Prince.

In addition, Prince denied at all times, prior to any

litigation, that there were any lease agreements which were signed
beyond the original five year period, thereby excusing Prince of
any

further

obligations.

Those

issues

are

contained

in a

completely separate lawsuit, and any reference herein is irrelevant
to those issues presented to this Court.

Once again, it is the

blatant effort on the part of Prince to confound and otherwise
circumvent the issues relevant to this appeal.
In addressing the issue of whether or not a material breach
occurred, on page 25 of Prince's Brief, reference is made to "The
trial court's conclusion of law in question was based upon Healey's
refusal to convey those interest and Healey's failure to disclose
5

his prior

financial

self-dealings.

When those elements are

combined there is no question that a material breach occurred."
The foregoing statement is not only offensive to Healey, but
blatantly wrong, and not even part of the Court record. There was
no discussion, evidence or testimony in regard to "Healey's prior
financial self-dealings".

Once again, a transparent attempt by

Prince to circumvent the evidence and place statements before this
Court which are simply not in existence. If in fact such evidence
exists to support the findings of the Court, then why has Prince
failed to set them forth in his argument?
REPLY NO. 3
PRINCE HAS FAILED TO ADDRESS THE
DISTRIBUTIONS FROM INCOME FUND
In Prince's Fifth Argument, beginning on page 28 of his brief,
Prince attempts to justify the determination of the trial court in
finding that the distributions from Income Fund were not equal to
both parties.

Such contention is not supported by the evidence.

The evidence, as marshalled in the best possible view to Prince, as
set forth in the brief of Prince at page 29 was that Healey
received $13,750.00 more than Prince because he was the General
Partner of Income Fund.

It was at the insistence of Prince that

Healey serve as General Partner of Income Fund, and it was never an
issue at trial that Healey acted improperly or inappropriately as
the general partner.

(R. 667-668 L. 23-5).

Without explanation,

the trial court found that in regard to Income Fund, Healey
received $117,073.50 more than Prince, and awarded judgment for
one-half of the amount ($58,536.75). Even in the brief of Prince,
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he does not advance any evidence, testimony, documents or even
argument to justify the actions of the trial court. Even assuming,
arguendo,

that

Healey

was

not

entitled

to

the

additional

$13,750.00, as a general partner, judgment should have been entered
for one-half of the $13,750.00, or $6,875.00, not $58,536.75. As
further arguments are set forth, it becomes more obvious that the
trial court simply adopted and otherwise signed the Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as submitted by Prince,
without any thought or contemplation of its own.
REPLY NO. 4
PRINCE DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT THE
ENTRY OF JUDGMENT AGAINST HEALEY
IN THE SUM OF $181,151.22 WAS IN ERROR
It is interesting that in the counterclaim of Prince, an
accounting is requested, and in opening statements at trial the
only thing requested was an accounting.

At the conclusion of

trial, even though Prince himself testified that misappropriation
of partnership assets by Healey had never been a concern to him,
the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by
Prince

contained

language

and

assertions

for conversion

misappropriation of funds and partnership assets.

and

The record is

void as to any evidence to show misappropriation or conversion of
partnership funds or assets.
From the very beginning of trial as contained in Prince's
opening statement, the only thing requested by Prince is an
accounting of the partnership assets.

(R. 612, L.21-23).

A substantial portion of Healey's original brief was directed
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towards the improper entry of judgment against Healey in the sum of
$181,151.22.

The judgment amount of $181,151.22 was based upon

receipt by Healey of partnership funds in the sum of $362,302.44
which were paid out for the benefit of partnership debts and
obligations belonging to Healey and Prince.

Prince had complete

and total knowledge of the funds, and it was at his insistence that
the transaction take place.

At trial, there was no dispute as to

how the monies were spent, and no dispute and disagreement by
Prince that those monies were in fact paid towards joint debts and
obligations which benefitted Prince and Healey.

Even now, Prince

does not have any dispute with the arguments set forth in the
original brief of Healey, and has not directed any portion of this
brief towards rebuttal of those arguments.

Without any dispute

between the parties, how can the Court come to the conclusion that
over $362,000.00 was taken by Healey?
Prince now finds himself in the unenviable position to defend
the actions of the trial court, which actions are not supported by
credible evidence.

In the brief of Prince, there is no showing

which would contradict the evidence and those arguments set forth
in Healey's Brief, under Point Three.
On page 43 of Prince's Brief, the conclusive statement is made
that "Substantial evidence exists in the record that supports the
trial court's determination that Healey converted Prince's interest
in monies received by the partnership or distributed from the
partnership ventures and those findings and the conclusions of law
related thereto should be upheld on appeal." Prince is correct in
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the assertion that it is the duty and obligation of appellant to
marshall the evidence in a manner to support the trial court.
However, if Prince believes that Healey failed to marshall existing
evidence, it would seem prudent for Prince to point out that same
evidence which he believes was not properly marshalled.

It is

impossible, even for Mr. Prince, to marshall evidence which simply
does not exist.
Even assuming the Court was justified in its decision to find
in favor of Prince, the only monies argued by Prince, which
argument

was

not

that

said

monies

were

"converted"

or

"misappropriated", but rather only unexplained, was the sum of
$117,000.00.

The Court, at best, was justified in entering

judgment against Healey in the sum of $58,500.00. (One-half of
$117,000.00).
the

As stated earlier, the judgment against Healey in

sum of almost

$240,000.00

is not supported

by credible

evidence, and has even been admitted by Prince to be an improper
amount.

Prince has remained silent on the issue of judgments

entered against Healey, for the obvious reason that he is in
agreement that the trial Court erred in entering those judgments.
REPLY NO. 5
THE VALUE OF THE PARTNERSHIP HAS NO
RELEVANCE TO THIS APPEAL
In the Sixth Argument of Prince's Brief, Prince asserts that
since Healey failed to submit evidence as to the value of the
partnership, he is now precluded from having judgment entered in
his favor to otherwise enforce the Memorandum Agreement.
argument is ludicrous.

Such an

The entire purpose of the Memorandum
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Agreement was to set forth the specific amounts that would be paid
by each partner, together with their understanding as to the
dissolution of the partnership.

The idea that additional proof

was needed, when all specific amounts were set forth, is without
logic.
Early on at trial, it was undisputed that Healey offered to buy
the interests of Prince for the same amount he was willing to be
paid.

(R. 631, L. 12-20).

If Prince believed that he was not

receiving the proper value of the partnership, or the partnership
was not worth those amounts, as set forth in the Memorandum
Agreement, then why did he not accept the offer of Healey to buy
his interest?

The answer is obvious, and that would be that the

amounts set forth in the Memorandum Agreement to pay to Healey for
his interests were a bargain.

There was no need at trial for

Healey to set forth any additional values of the partnership. The
value was set forth in the Agreement itself.
On pages 44 and 45 of Prince's brief, reference to Karen
English, a witness called by Prince, and an accountant for Prince
who examined all of the historical records of the partnership for
a period of 10 months, was such that she could not reconcile all of
the accounts, but on cross-examination the following dialogue took
place:
Q.

Why were you asked to go through all of these

historical documents?
A.

John (Prince) specifically asked me to put

together a debt schedule to determine the maturity date
10

of notes, the long-term debts that were appearing on the
balance sheets and to know what the payment schedules
were.

They were trying to determine when those notes

would be paid in full.
Q. Were you ever asked by Mr. Prince to go through
and find out what payments were made to Mr. Prince and
what payments were made directly to Mr. Healey?
A. No.
Q.

Did Mr. Prince ever indicate to you that Mr.

Healey had taken funds from the partnership that he was
not entitled to?
A. No.
Q. Did he (Prince) ever ask you to go through all
of the records and see if there was an inequality of
distribution between Mr. Prince and Mr. Healey?
A.

No.

(R. 1080, L. 6-25; R. 1080 L. 1)

In addition to the foregoing testimony, the Court accepted the
proffer of Yvonne Failner who was the accountant for both parties,
during their partnership relations. Yvonne Failner would testify
that it was her job to physically prepare and deliver all checks of
the partnership, and above all other things, she would always make
certain that the checks payable to Mr. Prince and Mr. Healey were
equal for the partnership management fees. (R. 1094, L. 18-25).
As

stated earlier, there can be no misappropriation of

partnership monies when there was not one witness, including those
called by Mr. Prince who testified to any misappropriation.
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Any

finding or conclusion by the Court that a conversion of partnership
assets took place by Healey is simply without evidentiary and legal
basis.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not have sufficient evidence to determine
that the Memorandum Agreement was null and void, and further that
money judgment in the approximate amount of $240,000.00 should have
been entered against Healey.
Prince there

Even in the arguments propounded by

is no argument

or disagreement

that the money

judgments entered by the trial court were in error.
The proper remedy for the appellate court is to either remand
this matter for new trial or to vacate the judgment entered and
order enforcement of the Memorandum Agreement, executed by the
parties herein.

The one constant factor, agreed to by both

parties, is that they executed the Memorandum Agreement with the
expectation of being bound to the terms thereof.
DATED this

f, d, day of February? 1994.
:<7

Les F. 'Engl^i&r
Attorney for Appellant
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